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1 Introduction
Even as the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) formally came into being at
the 2010 Budapest-Vienna ministerial conference, a growing sense appeared to be
taking hold among participants that the Bologna Process (BP) had, to a signiﬁcant
extent, “exhausted” itself after a little more than a decade of existence. That sense of
exhaustion was, in some respects, undoubtedly a positive development insofar as it
could be likened to the exhaustion of a marathon runner who has completed the
race. In less lyrical terms, the process appeared exhausted insofar as it had suc-
ceeded in achieving many of its initial goals, particularly at the level of the
enunciation and acceptance of broad policy templates. As a commissioned inde-
pendent assessment concluded at the time, “Most ‘architectural’ elements of the
EHEA, i.e. those involving legislation and national regulation, have been imple-
mented in most countries” (Westerheijden 2010, p. 5). At the same time, however,
this underlying sense of exhaustion also had a more negative dimension. Here it
appears rather more as an exhaustion born of frustration, of recognizing that perhaps
a plateau had been reached from which further advances might not be possible, or
would be possible only by overcoming inordinately difﬁcult obstacles. Those
frustrations, in large part, reflect the difﬁculties of on the ground implementation
where, as the assessment report also highlighted, institutional and program level
responses were “still wanting” (Ibid).
Given this situation, it would not be surprising if there were to be a (renewed)
tendency toward questioning the “soft law” foundations of the EHEA as it has
developed to date—i.e. the essentially non-binding character of the process, which
seeks to foster policy learning through the establishment of shared understandings
of best practice, processes of national reporting, and attendant peer review.
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These soft law moorings have generated a degree of criticism in the scholarly
literature. Most prominently, Garben (2010, 2011) has advanced a comparatively
broad-based critique of the soft law character of the Bologna Process, making the
case for the putative superiority of a regulation of the area by way of conventional,
“hard” European Union (EU) law—at least as regards those EHEA participating
states that are also EU member states. In so doing, she highlighted what she
regarded to be fundamental procedural failings as regards the democracy and
transparency of the process, as well as related substantive shortcomings concerned
with its lack of effectiveness. In this, she joined a wider body of criticism of the
so-called new modes of governance, principally concerned with what are taken to
be its negative consequences for both parliamentary and legal accountability
(cf. Idema and Keleman 2006).
Such criticisms undoubtedly have a degree of validity; issues of both account-
ability and effectiveness do arise in the context of the process, as indeed—it might
be added—of governance processes more generally. The question that needs to be
posed, however, is whether a hard law alternative is either a practical, or necessarily
a superior, option.
The question of practicality is a straightforward one. Bologna has soft law in its
DNA, and is—in the literal sense—practically inconceivable in another form.
Following a now well-known sequence of events, it was through the development
of loose forms of cooperation deliberately placed outside of the remit of the EU that
a European higher education (HE) policy space was ﬁnally created (cf. Muller and
Ravinet 2008), overcoming the longstanding and sometimes ﬁerce national resis-
tance which had long met European Commission initiatives to move in this
direction within an EU framework (cf. Corbett 2005). It is fair to say that little has
changed as regards this underlying dynamic in the intervening years. If states have
become more comfortable in discussing higher education policy in European fora,
they have shown no particular willingness to cede control over this chasse gardée
of national policy. Moreover, it is evident that the development of formal regulation
in the framework of a (currently) 47 member pan-European process, extending well
beyond the EU 28, is a political non-starter. As a practical matter, the EHEA will
“sink or swim” on the basis of its ability to make soft law structures work; there is
no politically realistic “hardening” alternative.
The argument could, however, further be made that, even were such a hardening
to be politically possible, it would not be substantively desirable. Insofar as the
Bologna Process has been successful in creating a common European “language” of
higher education policy (cf. Zgaga 2012), with widely shared points of comparison,
it has done so through the fostering of consensual dialogue, where no threat of
imposed solutions—of a “shadow of hierarchy” to use the jargon of the public
policy literature—hangs in the balance. It is this absence of compulsion that has
opened possibilities for policy learning, which have been signiﬁcantly—if unevenly
—seized. It is by no means certain that a hard law regime, even if it were it to be
possible, would produce better results. Given the sensitivity of the area, the risk
would rather be that any hypothetical moves toward a formal regulatory regime
would produce substantial national disengagement and/or non-compliance, while
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undermining the strong potential learning dynamics engendered by the existing,
looser forms of cooperation.
It is thus on this basis that the present paper proceeds to examine the future of the
EHEA as a governance process, seeking to probe how soft law instruments may be
better developed so as to introduce a renewed dynamism into an “exhausted”
process. To that end, a model of “experimentalist governance”, following Sabel and
Zeitlin (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010), is ﬁrst introduced below. Their four-stage
model is then mapped on to an account of the governance of the Bologna Process.
This mapping exercise particularly highlights the existence of systemic impedi-
ments preventing the development of strong dynamics of iterative policy learning
connecting the national and the European levels. The ﬁnal major section of the
paper then seeks to draw lessons from this analysis, looking at the ways in which
such impediments to policy learning might be removed or alleviated. Attention is
focused successively on the relationship of expertise (and experts) to the wider
policy process; the representativeness of European-level stakeholders; the higher
education policy discourse of the European Commission; and the reframing of
national higher education debates in terms which, over ﬁfteen years after the
Bologna Declaration, should now be seen as moving to a “post-reform” phase.
Overall, a sketch is drawn of a series of plausible developmental paths, which may
provide a means of both serving individual actor interests and the wider goal of
further developing a robust pan-European higher education policy forum.
2 Unpacking the New Modes of Governance
The new modes of governance are most readily associated with the development of
the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) within the framework of the
European Union. The OMC gained prominence as a generalized governance tem-
plate in the context of the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda in the early 2000s, though
the core idea of recourse to soft law instruments of governance may be traced a bit
further back, at least to the 1997 European Employment Strategy and the so-called
“Luxembourg Process”. The BP/EHEA may be understood in relation to this,
though with two caveats. The one, obviously, is the simple recognition that we are
concerned with a pan-European process extending well beyond the EU. The other,
perhaps somewhat less evidently, is that the BP/EHEA does not have a governance
or process dimension as an objective—i.e. the OMC, at least in part, sought to
foster more open or participatory forms of governance as something of a con-
comitant goal to the development of policy cooperation in given sectors. This is not
true per se of the BP, whose launch dynamics appear rooted ﬁrmly and exclusively
in reform agendas restricted to the higher education policy sector alone.
Nonetheless, though the BP/EHEA does not have these wider “democratizing”
goals, we may nonetheless draw on these approaches as a means of understanding
the functioning of the process itself, most particularly with a view to diagnosing its
eventual shortcomings. To this end, I will take as my point of departure Sabel and
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Zeitlin’s somewhat stylized or ideal-type model of “experimentalist governance” in
the EU (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010). This model sets out a four-stage policy
process, which may be presented as follows:
1. Goal Setting
The member states and EU institutions jointly establish framework goals and
measures for their achievement.
2. Delegated Responsibility
Lower level authorities (regulators, ministries, etc.) are “given the free-dom to
achieve these ends as they see ﬁt” (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p. 2).
3. Reporting and Peer Review
As the counterpart to this autonomy, however, the lower level authorities must
report regularly on their activities, and submit themselves to processes of peer
review.
4. Critical Re-evaluation and Policy Learning
Framework goals, methods, etc. are themselves periodically reviewed, “aug-
mented by such new participants whose views come to be seen as indispensable
to full and fair deliberation” (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p. 3).
While the ﬁrst three phases of the process as deﬁned by Sabel and Zeitlin largely
correspond to the “ofﬁcial” version of the OMC as advanced by the EU itself,1 the
fourth and ﬁnal phase points to a potentially more fundamental shift in the nature of
the policy process, tied to what the authors term “democratizing destabilization”. In
effect, the intention is to effect a gradual opening out of the policy process—in the
senses of both inclusivity and transparency—so as to allow for the expression of
new ideas capable of shaking up—“destabilizing”—the existing policy consensus.
This destabilization is further situated relative to the underlying conception of
experimentalist governance as fostering “directly deliberative polyarchy”, i.e.
comparatively decentralized policy spaces privileging collective, reasoned
discussions.
One need not, however, necessarily go as far as the argument for a systemic or
structural destabilization in order to tap into the underlying logic of experimentalist
governance. In effect, that which is being pointed to is the necessity to conceive of a
form of iterative policy learning as the key to the functioning of the model. If
experimentalist governance is to have a dynamic or distinctive rationale as a mode
of policymaking, it is through the fostering of such “learning” processes—i.e.
allowing for forms of comparatively open-ended or expansive deliberation, con-
ducive to innovation, such as are unlikely to be promoted by more conventional
“hard” policy processes driven by more immediate interests and outcomes. At least,
as Radaelli (2003, p. 8) underlined in an early study of the OMC, it is this core
premise of “a governance architecture based on incentives for learning” that allows
proponents of the OMC to make a plausible claim for this potentially being “better
1See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/open_method_coordination_en.htm. Website
last accessed 2.01.2015.
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governance”, rather than merely a “second-best option” when hard governance
instruments are not reasonably available.
This slightly modiﬁed version of the Sabel and Zeitlin model now established,
the following three sections of the paper will map the BP/EHEA relative to this
ideal-type policy process. The relatively unproblematic stages of goal setting and
delegation are ﬁrst briefly discussed. Somewhat more attention is then paid to the
rather more problematic area of reporting and peer review. Finally, systemic
shortcomings are highlighted as regards the ﬁnal, learning phase of the model. As
already noted in the introduction, it is this absence of a strong capacity to generate
iterative policy learning that is then principally addressed in the following part of
the paper, setting out the terms for a possible reform of key aspects of the process so
as to enhance its learning capacity.
3 Mapping the Governance of the Bologna Process
3.1 Setting Goals and Delegating Responsibilities
The BP/EHEA for the most part rather unproblematically conforms to the ﬁrst two
dimensions of the model, though somewhat distancing itself from the ideal-type
over time. The Bologna Declaration set out a series of (six) clearly delineated
objectives with relatively broad margins of interpretation, whose detailed transla-
tion was then left to the competent national or sub-national authorities—e.g. calling
for the “adoption of easily readable and comparable degrees”, based “on two main
cycles”, which sets a clear direction without, however, prescribing particular
structures. The early development of Bologna, moreover, could be seen as focusing
on an interconnected set of goals concerned with mobility, comparability and
quality assurance.
This balance, relative to the ideal-type of experimentalist governance, was then
somewhat blurred in the later development of the process. Latterly, the trend has
been to add further topics or areas for discussion, while eschewing more speciﬁc
goal setting. Thus, for example, wide-ranging topics such as the relationship of the
EHEA to the European Research Area (ERA), “lifelong learning”, and the “social
dimension” have been added—but for the most part without clear objectives being
agreed by the participating states comparable to those seen in the earlier stages of
the process.
The absence of goal setting in this way does not, of course, preclude meaningful
discussions in transnational fora or the opportunity to share “best practice”.
Comparative data may also, of course, be gathered under these rubrics, surveying
national patterns and practices. The absence of speciﬁcally deﬁned objectives does,
nonetheless, have inescapable implications as regards the more direct use of
benchmarking and peer review techniques.
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3.2 Reporting and Peer Review
Overall, this is a somewhat more problematic phase of the process. Some com-
mentators have viewed this as a “success story”. Ravinet (2008), for example,
argues that it is essentially through the effective use of benchmarking and peer
review that the Bologna Process may be seen to have gone from a system of
“voluntary participation” to one of “monitored cooperation”. Following her anal-
ysis, “countries feel increasingly bound by their commitments” because of: (1) The
multiplication of information sources acting as a check on the accuracy of national
reports and (2) The strength of socialization pressures (“naming and shaming”) on
poor performers by their peers to effect the necessary reforms.
This appears to be, however, a somewhat overly positive or optimistic account of
the process, where at a minimum a marked unevenness of implementation has
routinely been cited as a major problem (Amaral and Veiga 2012). These are also
ﬁndings which stand squarely at odds with the ﬁndings of Dr. Gangolf Braband and
myself in our 2010–2012 “Euro-Uni” research project.2 In our interview sample, all
European-level participants highlighted the excessive presence of “green” in BP
benchmarking exercises (indicating full achievement of the relevant objective in a
“trafﬁc light” system), noting inter alia the difﬁculty to “dissociate implementation
from prestige”3 (particularly in the case of generally poorly performing states).
National level participants, conversely (and predictably), defended the robustness of
their reporting techniques and attendant data, but even here not in terms which
would back the second—socialization—component of Ravinet’s analysis. While
stressing that they accurately reported outcomes, national ofﬁcials nonetheless
equally stressed that the use made of the results—i.e. whether it would be a spur to
(further) reform—was essentially determined by national agendas. “European
pressure”, in other words, largely came into play only where this pressure corre-
sponded to prior (often “uploaded”) national commitments. In the words of one
long-serving national ofﬁcial, “You put something on the European agenda because
it suits your own domestic needs”, as such “It creates a pressure to follow up a
commitment you made in the ﬁrst place. It is a bit of a chicken and egg question.”4
The 2012 BP Implementation Report also appeared to acknowledge this more
critical reading of the reporting and peer review process. The report, tellingly, noted
that “the colour dark green is less prevalent in some action lines than before”
(EACEA 2012, p. 7), reflecting “a more nuanced insight” as regards the yardsticks
2The project, funded as a competitively awarded internal research project by the University of
Luxembourg, sought to examine the dialogical dynamics leading to the creation of a “higher
education policy space” spanning the national and European levels. In the course of our research,
we conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 senior national and European-level policy-
makers, focusing on the European institutions and selected West European states. See further
Harmsen (2013).
3Interview with a senior European-level ofﬁcial, 22.07.2011.
4Interview with a senior national-level ofﬁcial, 06.06.2012.
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used for measurement or an extension in the scope of the indicator. The afﬁrmation,
obviously, is one of improvement—but in so doing also acknowledges the fairly
widespread sense of some of the limitations of the (previous) reporting system.
An overall balance sheet of the (in-)effectiveness of the reporting process is
beyond the scope of this short paper, but the broad tone of the 2012 report would
seem to capture the underlying reality. Essentially, it is clear that the process of
reporting and peer review has progressively improved over time. Primary infor-
mation gathering has become more systematic, external checks have been multi-
plied, and the evaluation of data has become more consistent. This does not
preclude the possibility of (egregious) national misreporting in individual cases—
actors who “manipulate the information they provide so as to show themselves,
deceptively, to best advantage” (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010, p. 13). It equally must be
qualiﬁed by an awareness of the possible limitations of the sources used for the
triangulation of data, potentially subject to the same unevenness as the primary data
which they are meant to check (cf. Geven 2012). It does, however, point to a
situation in which it could reasonably be argued that the mechanisms of reporting
and peer review have attained a minimum level of robustness such that this is
not/no longer the weak link in the chain of a model of experimentalist governance.
At the level of the overall process, the quality of the information available appears
broadly such as to allow for meaningful, evidence-based deliberation. If this
deliberation has not taken hold in the terms or to the extent that one might have
expected, the key thus lies elsewhere—as discussed below.
3.3 Critical Re-evaluation and Policy Learning
Relative to the analysis above, the question then becomes one, beyond information
gathering, of whether and how the BP feeds back into national policy processes.
Does it promote critical engagement, and widening participation, in a manner which
would allow for “democratizing destabilization” in the terms of Sabel and Zeitlin?
Or perhaps, more modestly, as suggested above, does it facilitate forms of iterative
policy learning?
Here the indications are quite strongly negative; there appear to be signiﬁcant
disconnects between the BP/EHEA policy arena and its national counterparts. On
the one hand, at a relatively diffuse level, there appears to be comparatively little
“Bologna awareness” on the ground. On the other hand, where comparatively
strong traces of the BP may be found in national debates, it is often used by national
governments as a means of restricting rather than fostering debates surrounding HE
policy. A broadly constructed image of “Bologna” is, in such scenarios, used to
legitimate wide-ranging HE reform programs by means of a strategy of “discursive
closure”.
Future Scenarios for the European Higher Education Area … 791
3.3.1 “Bologna Awareness”
Veiga’s (2010) comparative study of the (non-)embedding of the BP at institutional
level in seven comprehensive universities in seven different national contexts offers
a strong indication of the relatively limited penetration of the process at grassroots
level. Relative to the present context, Veiga (2010, p. 377) notes that “the per-
ceptions of Bologna as a policy process remain relatively low”. As she underlines,
there was little effort by the “pays politique” to raise awareness within the “pays
réel”, resulting particularly in a very limited awareness of the underlying rationales
for reform. At the political level, the BP came to be signiﬁcantly translated as a
“compliant action”—a sort of self-referential mimetism apparently unconnected to
deeper policy concerns.
A somewhat different picture emerges when moving from policy process to
policy implementation, as here aspects of the BP touch on the daily realities of
academics, students, and administrators. Even here, however, signiﬁcant aspects of
the process, including legal framework, convergence of degree structures, and
benchmarking activities, generated high proportions of “suspended opinions”
among respondents. Moreover, insofar as the differing stakeholder groups might be
differentiated, generally higher levels of awareness and engagement tended to be
found amongst university administrators, reinforcing the managerial image of the
process.
The overall portrait is thus one of generally low awareness of Bologna as a wider
policy process, suggesting in itself little prospect for the type of expansive, par-
ticipatory “destabilizing democratization” mooted in the original Sabel and Zeitlin
model to take hold. This, in turn, points to the possibility of a more strategic
manipulation of Bologna norms by centrally placed governmental actors, following
a logic of what is presently termed “discursive closure”.
3.3.2 “Discursive Closure”
Moving to strategies of “discursive closure”,5 it is no longer simply a matter of the
“non-penetration” of Bologna norms, but rather of the strategic use of those norms
by centrally placed actors so as to reframe—usually in a restrictive manner—higher
education debates in other policy arenas. Broadly, where Bologna discourses have
been strategically constructed in this manner, one might identify West European
and EU accession state versions of the pattern.6
5The term is borrowed from Dostal’s (2004) study of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), though presently conceptualized in a somewhat different manner.
6It should be underlined that the present examples concern only selected instances of the political
“use” (cf. Woll and Jacquot 2010) of Bologna norms, as distinct from the question of the wider
patterns of differential implementation across the full range of participating states. These wider
patterns are, for example, interestingly surveyed (and categorized) in Furlong (2010).
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In the West European version—seen in countries such as Austria, Germany, and
Spain—the Bologna Process is used as an instrument of domestic leverage by
governments seeking to legitimate much wider projects of structural reform in the
higher education sector. The Bologna Process thus becomes “Bologna”, often
generating corresponding “anti-Bologna” oppositions.
In the German case, for example, Maesse (2010) has convincingly demonstrated
how a technocratic “consensus discourse” was constructed around the Bologna
Process, effectively seeking to restrict debates to questions over “how” reforms
were to be realized, while correspondingly pushing questions concerned with the
validity of the objectives themselves off the agenda. This, in turn, may be seen to
have triggered what came to be styled as “anti-Bologna” protests, as reform
opponents at least discursively took the governmental position at face value. These
critics contested what they regarded to be the imposition of undesirable “European
norms”, associated with the “ravages of a neo-liberal modernization agenda” (see
Charle and Soulié 2007; Schultheis et al. 2008). These contestations, moreover,
extended over signiﬁcant swathes of the sector—in the German case encompassing
student groups, professors’ associations, and prominent individual academics. As
such, the “anti-Bologna” movement brought to the fore a broad range of concerns
about curricular reform, accessibility, and professional status, as well as the more
diffuse defence of a traditional, Humboldtian ideal of the university (cf. Thumfart
and Braband, forthcoming). The strategic reconstruction of Bologna requirements,
intended to restrict debate, could thus be seen to have reaped a predictable whirl-
wind, prompting a corresponding systemic opposition to the European process
itself.
In contrast to the whirlwind seen in the West European pattern, the EU accession
state pattern saw the Bologna Process substantially enter into the slipstream of the
EU enlargement process. In the case of a number of CEE countries, Bologna came
to be treated, or at least was effectively portrayed, as if it were a de facto part of EU
conditionality—i.e. requirements which simply had to be met if one was to “join the
club”, and over which meaningful substantive debate was thus not possible. For
example, Dakowska (forthcoming), in the case of Poland, highlights what she terms
a “no alternative” narrative, used to push through a wide-ranging package of HE
reforms. In similar terms, Deca (2015), analyzing the Romanian case, points to a
“negative legitimation” strategy, whereby the emphasis was placed on the poten-
tially isolating consequences of not embracing a broad series of putatively
Bologna-inspired reforms.
Here too, therefore, Bologna may be associated with a “discursive closure”—
broadly used so as to close down rather than to open up wider higher education
debates. Strikingly, however, corresponding “anti-Bologna” movements and dis-
courses did not signiﬁcantly take hold in the CEE countries, perhaps reflecting the
wider asymmetric dynamics engendered by the temporally parallel process of EU
enlargement (cf. Dakowska and Harmsen 2015). Indeed, in the Romanian case,
Deca even notes the subsequent use by student groups of “Bologna norms” of
stakeholder participation in their opposition to a later set of government HE
reforms.
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This later Romanian example, however, appears to be very much the exception.
Although this still requires more systematic research (focusing on the political uses
rather more than the administrative implementation of Bologna), the general trend
appears relatively clear. Far from fostering domestic higher education debates,
Bologna appears rather more to have been used as an instrument to restrict them.
This, to a signiﬁcant extent, may be seen as a structural or systemic development.
The main reason for governments to participate in an essentially normative policy
arena such as Bologna, apart from the simple objective of recognition for more
marginal members of the process, is to acquire discursive resources of a type that
may be deployed in another policy arena with regulatory and/or redistributive
consequences (cf. Harmsen 2013). That they should use the leverage which they
have sought to give themselves is thus not surprising—but it does, effectively,
choke off the possibility of iterative policy learning necessary for the process to
sustain a dynamic development over time.
Can this be overcome? The failing presently identiﬁed is arguably a more
generally symptomatic one for experimentalist or soft law modes of governance. It
is not, however, irremediable—and the speciﬁc context of the EHEA offers perhaps
a distinctively promising set of possibilities for re-engaging a more meaningful
policy learning process by way of completing a feedback loop. To this end, four key
lessons for the EHEA moving forward are drawn out below.
4 Lessons for the EHEA
Following from the analysis above, the four lessons below each concern possible
developmental paths concerned with enhancing the capacity of the EHEA as a
process to promote policy learning. Focused on removing impediments to learning
at the system level, each lesson nonetheless also points to the manner in which the
underlying interests of the actor(s) concerned could be strategically served by
pursuing the suggested path.
4.1 Resisting an “Epistemic Temptation”
As the EHEA matures, there is a risk of the process turning in on itself—becoming,
in the words of the 2010 assessment report (Westerheijden 2010, p. 9), “adminis-
tration without much real impact on the reality of higher education.” Following
much the same logic, it is presently argued that the EHEA must not be allowed to
go down a path where it is increasingly focused on comparatively narrow technical
issues. Many in the process might feel themselves more comfortable with a nar-
rowing agenda—an “epistemic temptation”—in which the EHEA comes to be seen
as essentially concerned with issues of detailed implementation (if not simply
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mopping up), at the expense of its role as a wider policy forum. Such an isolated
expertise is not, however, desirable, nor in the longer term sustainable.
It is clear that international organizations in general derive substantial authority
through possessing or providing distinctive expertise; it is, simply put, an
“authority” that derives from the ability to make “authoritative” pronouncements in
a particular area, drawing on forms of specialized technical or professional
knowledge (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, pp. 24–29). The ability of forms of
international organization to assume such authority—irrespective of the (non-)
existence of formal institutional arrangements—has perhaps been most influentially
captured in Peter Haas’ widely cited (and, in some respects, over extended) concept
of “epistemic communities”. Such communities, as Haas deﬁnes them, are “groups
of professionals, often from a variety of different disciplines, which produce
policy-relevant knowledge about complex technical issues” (Haas 1992, p. 16). The
more that such groups are able to achieve a consensus in a given area, encom-
passing both substantive and causal beliefs as to the nature of good or effective
policy, the more they may be able to set the agenda at the relative expense of more
diffuse political concerns. The international organization of expertise may, in other
words, displace the locus of decision-making from broad political to more technical
fora, with the relative merits of policy solutions as viewed within the expert
community correspondingly establishing the prevailing policy templates.
The BP clearly has elements of such an epistemic community. The process, in
speciﬁc areas such as quality assurance or the development of qualiﬁcations
frameworks, is invested with a speciﬁc technical competence. More widely, it can
be seen to have created an expert community, possessed of its own thick “coor-
dinative discourse” (cf. Schmidt 2006), allowing for the specialist discussion of
policy issues.
The development of such areas of expertise and governance technologies is,
moreover, a substantial strength of the process. It does, in the terms set out above,
allow for the making of authoritative claims on the basis of specialist knowledge,
which carry authority relative to political actors. This, in turn, serves to legitimate
particular policy templates and to delegitimate others, substantially on the basis of
the consensus that has emerged in the group.
The limits of such a “depoliticization” also, however, have to be recognized; an
isolated expertise, turned in on itself and concerned only with relatively subsidiary
questions of policy instrumentation, is likely simply to atrophy over time. On the
one hand, if such a community is to exercise an influence, it must maintain clear
channels of communication to the wider policy process and constellations of
concerned actors (cf. Dunlop 2012). On the other hand, such a community must
also itself remain open to wider influences, and in particular stay attuned to the
evolving policy agenda.
In the present context, this focuses attention on two sets of crucial connections.
At a macro-level, it is important that the work of the Bologna Follow-Up Group
(BFUG) continue to be connected to a wider political process, as embodied in the
(now) triennial ministerial conference, such that the linkages between detailed
reforms and wider political agendas are not lost. At a micro-level, it is similarly
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necessary for national ofﬁcials engaged with the BP to remain closely connected to
national decision-making processes, capable of acting as influential mediators
between the two (or multiple) policy arenas.
4.2 Revisiting the Role of European-Level Stakeholders
The (more) effective functioning of the EHEA in terms of an experimentalist model
also requires that one revisit the role played by European-level stakeholders in the
process. It should, in this respect, ﬁrst be noted that sectoral stakeholders, in
comparative terms, have enjoyed a strong and structured presence in the BP, and
have in some instances clearly exercised an important influence (for example, on
such issues as the development of the social dimension or student participation in
governance structures). Relatively little attention has, however, been paid to their
role as representative bodies—i.e. “Who” do they represent? and “How” do they
represent (in the sense of the patterns of connections or disconnections between
European peak-level bodies and national-level member organizations)?
Despite the substantial growth in the body of Bologna research, including a
limited, but important component concerned with the policy process itself, we still
know relatively little about the patterns of representation which have or have not
developed. More speciﬁcally, the work of Manja Klemenčič (2011) has, to some
extent, addressed these questions as regards student representation—noting, for
example, the existence of something of a divide between a European Student Union
(ESU) agenda “almost ‘hijacked’ by the issues related to the BP” (Klemenčič 2011,
pp. 1 and 18) and national agendas still more related to welfare and tuition issues
(as well as national “misinterpretations” of the BP). We have, however, no com-
parable analysis on the institutional side as regards the European University
Association (EUA) and/or the European Association of Institutions in Higher
Education (EURASHE). Equally, we have little work that looks at the represen-
tativeness of the stakeholder community as a whole, including the relative absence
of “line academics” from the process.
The intention in making this point, it should be underlined, is not one of making
an a priori criticism. Rather, it is to call attention to the fact that these are major
links in a representative process, which must be understood and critically scruti-
nized as such, if that process is to work in a reasonably inclusive and effective
manner. This concern with the overall process, moreover, may also be seen to
chime with the interests of the stakeholder groups themselves–whose longer term
sustainability cannot be divorced from the quality of their connections with their
grassroots membership and their effectiveness in representing the prevailing con-
cerns of that membership.
In this regard, one must particularly bear in mind that the nature of European
policy-making is often such that arenas create stakeholders, as much as stakeholders
create arenas. European-level stakeholders, often supported by EU funding (Batory
and Lindstrom 2011), have to some extent a vested interest in supporting the
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development of European-level policy solutions, which may or may not correspond
to the priorities of their national constituent organizations.7 Whether or to what
extent such a disconnect exists thus needs to be problematized, insofar as the (lack
of) penetration or resonance of Bologna issues beyond the narrow EHEA arena
itself may be substantially explicable with reference to the possible existence of
such structurally induced shortcomings.
4.3 Recasting the Higher Education Discourse
of the European Commission
In contrast to the discussion of the wider stakeholder community above, a critical
look at the role of the European Commission rapidly turns to substantive criticism,
given the development of an exceptionally narrow view of policy in the area, which
singularly fails to exploit the considerable possibilities open to the institution. The
Commission, through the propagation of its increasingly constrained “moderniza-
tion” agenda, has become a signiﬁcant deadweight as regards the potential devel-
opment of a more dynamic European-level higher education forum. The
modernization agenda in its current form (European Commission 2011), with its
one-dimensional focus on the economic dimension of higher education alone, is
both narrow and narrowing—i.e. the discourse in itself represents an impoverished
view of higher education, and perhaps even more has the effect, given the pivotal
role of the actor concerned (cf. Keeling 2006), of choking off potentially much
richer dialogues.
The speciﬁc terms of the critique need perhaps be spelled out, as much of the
problem, from the point of view of fostering wider dialogues facilitative of policy
learning, stems from what appears to be a sort of reiﬁcation of the Commission
position around a narrowly deﬁned orthodoxy over time. This, moreover, concerns
not so much directly its position within the BP/EHEA per se, but rather its moves
toward the development of a distinctive EU higher education policy arena, which
strategically exploits the space opened up by the BP for other European-level
initiatives.
The early phase of post-1999 positioning by the Commission appears readily
comprehensible. Notably, its 2003 communication, on “The Role of Universities in
the Europe of Knowledge”, sketches out a broad and plausible survey of the sector
at the time—not unfairly highlighting the “comparatively isolated universe”
inhabited by (many) European universities “for a very long period of time” in
relation to both their immediate social environment and the wider world (European
Commission 2003, p. 22). Relative to this diagnosis, central questions for the sector
7See Cram (1993) on the European Commission as a “purposeful opportunist”, strategically cre-
ating a demand for European-level action.
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are posed in relation to its growing economic relevance, in terms consonant with the
EU’s wider Lisbon Agenda.
By way of contrast, even a cursory glance at the Commission’s 2011 commu-
nication points to this wider agenda having been lost. The title, indeed, rather gives
the game away from the ﬁrst page—“Supporting Jobs and Growth—An Agenda for
the Modernisation of Europe’s Higher Education Institutions”. Higher education is
simply subsumed under wider economic goals, with the structure of the paper itself
further cashing out this logic. In contrast to the 2003 document, which starts with a
vision of the sector and works out to seek interconnections, the 2011 document is
structured almost entirely around the enunciation of policy priorities exogenous to
the sector itself. Higher education as a distinct entity, with its own logics and
purposes, seems to disappear from the screen.
This clearly poses serious problems for the wider development of meaningful
European-level dialogues. In effect, it is this positioning by the Commission which
substantially, if by no means exclusively, accounts for the often mooted charac-
terization of “Bologna” as “neo-liberal”, insofar as “European” policy in the higher
education sector is identiﬁed with a narrowly deﬁned “modernization”. As a result,
“Europe”, in relation to higher education, is often identiﬁed with a narrow set of
policy options, rather than a wider space of exchange—and rejected as such.
Relative to this, one might respectfully suggest that the Commission could and
should play a rather different role in relation to the sector—shifting away from the
role of advocate to that of honest broker. The sector would clearly be better served
by a Commission more concerned with facilitating broad dialogues about higher
education at the European level, within which its economic dimension would
equally clearly continue to occupy a central (but no longer exclusive) role. At the
same time, this would also appear to be in the strategic interest of the Commission
itself, insofar as it is concerned to develop a more robust European-level policy
arena in the sector. It would seem self-evident that such an arena, in an area of
considerable national political sensitivity, will not be developed through an insis-
tence on the predetermined acceptance of a narrowly deﬁned agenda to the
exclusion of a broader spectrum of alternatives. This failing, if left unaddressed,
will continue to be a major brake on any serious development of the area, including
that of a putative “modernization” itself.
4.4 Reframing National Higher Education Policy Debates
The ﬁnal lesson returns us to national higher education debates, and the relative
lack of penetration by or engagement with Bologna/the EHEA at the national level.
As discussed in the previous section, part of the explanation for this shortcoming—
such that the feedback loop is not closed up so as to facilitate policy learning—lies
in the pursuit by national governments of strategies of “discursive closure”.
Governments selectively use broadly deﬁned “Bologna norms” to legitimate par-
ticular policy choices, correspondingly restricting wider policy debates. The
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government, in effect, sets itself up as the authoritative mediator between the
national and the European arenas, and thus, at least from a purely strategic point of
view, would have no interest in facilitating the opening of further channels of
communication between those arenas. Insofar as this is true, why would govern-
mental actors cede this strategic advantage?
Occasionally, perhaps, individual actors may listen to the “better angels of their
nature” and, by acts of grace or charity, unilaterally withdraw from an advantageous
position. A generalized outbreak of such altruism nonetheless appears no more
likely here than in other walks of life. At a systemic level, the question to be posed
is thus rather one of whether the strategic advantage remains a strategic advantage
—and here it might reasonably be suggested that the leitmotif of the BP/EHEA has
changed, and changed in such a way as to make it more amenable to dialogue.
The ﬁrst phase of Bologna was undoubtedly marked by an ethos of “reform”.
Already the 1998 Sorbonne meeting set the tone for a process whereby the creation
of a European framework was primarily conceived in terms intended to leverage
difﬁcult domestic reforms (see, for example, Haskel 2009). In the more than ﬁfteen
years since the launch of the process, however, major changes have occurred,
fundamentally reshaping the context for at least a lead group of countries.
Signiﬁcant reforms have been realized, both in connection with the BP and more
widely. This has, moreover, correspondingly reshaped the landscape of national
higher education systems and the attendant demands of policy. There are, evidently,
a great variety of national situations, having undergone very uneven degrees of
change relative to highly diverse starting points. Nevertheless, at the level of the
process as a whole, it no longer makes sense to speak of an agenda dominated by
“reform” in the same terms as at the outset. Different problems and dynamics must
inevitably come to the fore as the EHEA enters a “post-reform” phase.
Most evidently, at least for those countries having undergone major reforms, the
focus has broadly shifted to questions of system steering. Again with due recog-
nition of the diversity of national systems concerned, the broad thrust of reforms
may nonetheless be described in terms of having moved from what were often
comparatively hierarchical “command and control” models, with a strongly inter-
ventionist governmental presence, to systems which grant higher education insti-
tutions considerably more formal autonomy with, as a counterpart, new or extended
mechanisms of external accountability (cf. Harmsen 2014). Correspondingly, that
which policymakers now require is rather less the leverage of external legitimation,
and rather more new understandings of how to operate the levers of a complex
system, so as to allow for a necessary and desirable institutional-level autonomy,
while also permitting the degree of steering required to secure overall system-level
policy goals. Operating in such an environment thus requires new governance
technologies, laying a particular emphasis on dialogue or communication—i.e.
“steering”, by deﬁnition, requires a connectedness and responsiveness which mil-
itates against the type of unilateral “discursive closure” identiﬁed earlier.
The questions posed for the EHEA are those of how it might engage this
changed reality, and this on two levels:
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• How, within its remit, may the EHEA contribute to dialogues about “best
practice” in terms of developing policy instruments related to the steering of
complex higher education systems (and this in a context where it is unlikely that
the process will move signiﬁcantly toward encompassing governance or man-
agement issues per se)?
• How, in developing these substantive dialogues, might the process itself be
further opened out—drawing in and engaging a broader range of actors, par-
ticularly national-level stakeholders, than is presently the case?
If there are no easy answers to these questions, the broad direction of devel-
opment nevertheless appears rather clear and rather clearly promising.
A “post-reform” EHEA should, by the nature of the issues under discussion, be
more amenable to the development of wider, more inclusive dialogues, having the
potential to foster dynamic processes of policy learning.
5 Conclusion
The present analysis of potential future scenarios for the development of the EHEA,
as outlined in the introduction, has been developed by a series of interlinked moves.
The case for the inescapably soft law future of the process (if it is to have a
sustained future) was ﬁrst made, as a matter of both political realism and desirable
policy development. This gave way, in turn, to an analysis of the governance of the
BP/EHEA to date, in relation to a prominent ideal-type model of experimentalist
governance as developed by Sabel and Zeitlin. This mapping of the process in
relation to the model identiﬁed the absence of a strong logic of iterative policy
learning as its principal shortcoming. On this basis, four lessons were then drawn,
pointing to potential developmental scenarios whereby signiﬁcant impediments to
policy learning might be removed—re-energizing the process as a whole in ways
which further could reasonably be seen as serving the underlying interests of the
actors concerned.
The identiﬁcation of such possibilities does not, of course, equate with their
realization. Here as elsewhere, in-built inertias will be strong. On the negative side
of the ledger, it might also be noted that many of the difﬁculties noted above in the
speciﬁc context of the BP/EHEA reflect more general problems that have also
afflicted the operation of the EU’s OMC (see, for example, de la Porte and Nanz
2004; Smismans 2008). The core issues of both accountability and effectiveness
highlighted in the present case have similarly dogged other attempts at developing
soft law modes of governance.
Relative to this more general pattern, however, the distinctiveness of the
BP/EHEA should ﬁnally be underlined. Undoubtedly, as a pan-European body, the
BP/EHEA is faced with a diversity of situations extending well beyond that seen in
the narrower EU context—raising, in some instances, questions of a basic gov-
ernability that cannot be ignored. Yet, this very diversity—and even, paradoxically,
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the potential “ungovernability” of the process beyond a certain point—is also an
asset. The EHEA, unlike the EU, casts no “shadow of hierarchy”. The process may
be opened out—in terms of both substantive issues and scope of participation—
with no fear that it conceals an underlying threat of formal regulation by stealth
within its structures. It is this very openness which needs to be seized and devel-
oped so as to facilitate the wider channels of policy learning discussed above.
For wider policy learning of this sort to take place, strategically placed actors—
most prominently, national governments and the European Commission—would
themselves, of course, have to “learn” that their own wider interests may be better
served by the fostering of more inclusive, structured dialogues. This is clearly
neither automatic nor unproblematic. Returning to the introductory discussion of
the possible exhaustion of the process, it is this step that may indeed ﬁnally prove to
be a step too far. Yet, for the EHEA ultimately to succeed or fail as a learning
process would, if nothing else, appear a ﬁtting challenge.
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